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“Lenin was right.  There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than 
to debauch the currency.  The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of 
destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose”.  J.M. 
Keynes, Economic Consequences of the Peace, Chapter 19. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, Ireland, in common with most of the industrialised world, has 
experienced low rates of inflation which contrast sharply with the experience of the 
previous decade and a half.  A significant factor lying behind this regime shift was a 
radical change in accepted economic theory and in the views of policymakers
1.  Beliefs, 
based on the so-called Phillips curve, that policymakers could choose a long-run low 
unemployment/high inflation combination for their economies were dashed after the 
painful experiences of the 1970s, when most countries suffered high inflation and high 
unemployment simultaneously
2.  Hence the debate which previously existed, on 
whether an economy should, in certain circumstances, deliberately pursue long-run 
inflationary policies, has largely disappeared.  This new era of low inflation has, 
however, prompted a new and more subtle debate over what the goal of monetary 
policy should be.  Should monetary authorities remain satisfied with the existing 
situation of low and stable inflation?  Alternatively, are there large long-term costs 
associated with even a low rate of inflation (e.g. of the order of  2 to 3 per cent.) ?  If 
there are, should we press on further and aim for price stability? 
 
This paper addresses these important questions.  On the one hand, we could opt to live 
with the status quo and, hence, pursue low and stable inflation as the primary objective 
of monetary policy.  On the other hand, we could push for complete price stability.  
The issue is of central concern to the Central Bank of Ireland in the present context of 
low Irish inflation.  In addition, it is an issue which should be high on the agenda of 
European policymakers as they contemplate the prospect of a centralised European 
monetary policy under Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  The rest of the paper 
is divided into four main sections.  Section 2 outlines the main costs of inflation which 
                                                 
1 See Taylor (1996) for a discussion of this issue. 
2 Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) provided convincing theoretical arguments as to why beliefs in a 
long-run unemployment/inflation trade-off were misguided.   2
form the basis of the argument in favour of price stability as the ultimate goal of 
monetary policy.  Although many of the costs of inflation are quite subtle in their 
effects, it is argued nonetheless that these are likely to be important, especially in their 
combined impact, even at relatively modest rates of inflation.  However, despite the 
extensive costs of even moderate rates of inflation, since a move to a regime of price 
stability may also involve significant costs, it is still not clear that economic policy 
geared towards a permanently fixed level of prices would be optimal.  This issue is 
taken up in Section 3 of the paper where the transitory costs of moving to price 
stability are considered in detail.  In section 4 we consider the possibility that a regime 
of completely stable prices may involve permanent costs over and above the costs of 
disinflating.  Such arguments concentrate on the possibility of there being permanent 
unemployment costs associated with both the process of disinflation and the position of 
price stability itself.  In addition, certain economists argue that monetary policy 
becomes ineffective in times of deep recession when prices stability forms the 
backdrop.  Section 5 summarises and puts forward some of the formal conclusions 
which can be made given the current state of economic knowledge.  
 
Before examining the separate cases for and against price stability as the ultimate goal 
of monetary policy, it is important to clarify exactly what is meant by “stable” prices. 
In the context of this paper, price stability refers to the stability of the aggregate price 
index over a chosen reference period
3.  It does not mean that the prices of individual 
products do not change over time.  Such prices will, of course, change in response to 
changing supply and demand conditions in individual markets.  It is also generally 
accepted that the term “price stability”  is consistent with at least some positive rate of 
measured inflation.  This is because the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is the most 
popular measure of aggregate prices, is based on a weighted average of the prices of  a 
variety of goods and services.  The weights used in constructing the index are only 
changed periodically and, hence, do not adequately take account of the way in which 
                                                 
3 This paper leaves aside the issue of whether, once the monetary authority has chosen its objective, it 
should choose inflation or price targeting.  As Fischer (1996) describes, in the case of inflation 
targeting, base drift is allowed in that failures to meet the inflation target are treated as bygones and 
no attempt is made to offset such failures.  Price level targeting, on the other hand, involves pursuing 
a policy of below average inflation (or outright deflation when price stability is the target) after a 
period of above average inflation.   3
consumers tend to substitute relatively less expensive items for goods which have 
become relatively more expensive.  This results in an upward bias in the estimates of 
aggregate price increases
4.  Another reason why the term price stability should be 
associated with at least some positive rate of measured inflation  is that some non-
inflationary price increases are to be expected over time in order to reflect quality 
improvements
5.   Recent estimates, although not explicitly for Ireland, suggest that a 
measured rate of inflation of about 1% is consistent with average aggregate price 
stability. As a result, in considering the dilemma posed in the title of this paper, what 
we are really talking about is a choice between living with 2% to 3% inflation or 
attempting to drive average aggregate price increases down to about 1% or less per 
annum
6,7. 
                                                 
4 In Ireland, the weights are changed approximately every seven years and they are based on the 
results of the most recent Household Expenditure Survey.  Hence, what is termed the “product 
substitution” bias may be quite large in Ireland compared to other countries where the weights are 
altered more frequently. 
5 An increase in a good’s quality, however, is not necessarily accompanied by an increase in its price. 
The best example of this is, perhaps, the output of the computer industry where there has been a large 
improvement in quality and simultaneously a large fall in price due to massive technological 
improvements over time. 
6 Summers (1996a) argues that it may not be sensible to adjust target CPI for the above effects, on the 
basis that when people are planning for the future, it is the “sticker price” of goods and services and 
not the quality-adjusted change in cost that is important. 
7 Selgin (1997) argues that the optimal policy involves allowing the price level to fall over time to 
reflect increases in productivity.  (See also Dowd, 1995a, for a rebuttal of this viewpoint along with 
Selgin’s, 1995, counterarguments.)  This “productivity norm” argument, which had many prominent 
adherents before the Keynesian revolution, offers another interesting angle to the above debate.  It is, 
however, left aside for the purposes of this paper.  We are very grateful to Professor Kieran Kennedy 
for alerting us to Selgin (1997).   4
2. The Costs of Inflation 
2.1  Introduction 
In this section, the various costs of inflation are outlined, thus providing the basis of 
the argument in favour of price stability.  Following previous analyses, we make use of 
a somewhat artificial framework, in that we do not explore in any detail the policies 
which give rise to inflation in the first place.  Inflation does not arise in a vacuum and, 
in part, reflects the actions and policy decisions of both the government and the 
monetary authority.  Hence, for a fuller understanding of the issue, it would be 
necessary to examine the overall strengths and drawbacks of policy options which 
result in inflation and those which do not.  Such an approach is, however, well beyond 
the remit of this paper, and the conventional style of analysis of this issue is employed 
throughout.  Table 1 below outlines and briefly describes the main costs which are 
generally associated with inflation, with the most widely discussed costs being placed 
at the top of the table.  In what follows, we first discuss these costs in general terms 
and attempt to evaluate their likely importance.  Subsequently, based upon this 
discussion, we provide a tentative assessment of the likely combined importance of 
such costs at low, but positive, rates of inflation. 
   5
Table 1: Classification of the Costs of Inflation
Row  Main Costs  Brief Description 
1  Shoe Leather  Inflation makes it costly to hold money balances.   This is because currency yields no interest and other components of the money stock, such as current account balances, 
offer rates of return which are considerably less than those available on other assets.  Money’s twin roles as a means of exchange and a store of value are, therefore, 
damaged and this results in a reduction in holdings of real money balances.  Such a reduction causes inconvenience and results in more frequent trips to the bank (hence 
the label “shoe leather” costs). 
2  Inflation and the Tax System  Most tax systems are not fully indexed for inflation.  Hence, the interaction of inflation and the tax system exacerbates the distortionary influence of taxes.  The partial 
indexation of marginal income tax bands provides the government with an easy and surreptitious source of revenue growth and, hence, can encourage fiscal laxity.  Far 
more important, however, is the interaction of inflation and the taxation of capital income.  Because partial indexation results in an overstatement of capital pro
reduces the real net of tax return to savers.  Accordingly, inflation reduces welfare by distorting the allocation of consumption over time and distorting capital 
accumulation decisions.  
3  Unit of Account and Uncertainty 
Effects 
Inflation interferes with money’s role as a unit of account by adversely affecting the signalling power of prices.  Prices perform a central part in the market economy 
through providing valuable signals to economic agents.  Interference with such signals can result in w
anticipated inflation rates can interfere with these signals if agents change prices in an uncoordinated fashion in response to inflationary pressures.  Increased inflation 
is, moreover, held to lead to increased uncertainty, thus further interfering with the informational role of prices.
4  Inflation and Economic Growth   Inflation may damage longer-term economic growth prospects.  As discussed above, inflation has an adverse effect on the eff
Inflation can also lower the rate of investment and productivity growth in an economy, through, for example, its impact upon uncertainty and its interaction with the 
taxation system.  All the above effects can result in a lowering of the long -run growth potential of the economy.
5  Redistribution costs  Unanticipated inflation gives rise to arbitrary redistributions of income and wealth when people engage in nominal contracts.  Such redistributions are inequitab
unfair.  For example, when inflation unexpectedly increases, this leads to an arbitrary redistribution of wealth from creditors to debtors.  Those, such as pensioners 
dependant on fixed, or less than fully indexed nominal incomes, are also badly affected by inflation.  
6  Resources Devoted to the 
Financial Sector 
With high inflation, it is argued that a greater proportion of an economy’s resources are devoted to the financial sector, thus reducing the amount available for 
consumption and investment.  More generally, the existence of inflation involves dead -weight costs insofar as resources are diverted into attempting to protect against its 
effects. 
7  Asset price bubbles/Over-
investment in inflation hedges 
It is argued that there is a tendency for inflationary economies to develop bubbles in asset and raw material prices.  This can lead to severe over
of activity affected, which can end up being very costly for the economy.  More generally, it can be argued that the uncertainty 
incentive to overinvest in inflation hedges, such as real assets, thereby affecting the rate of productive investment.
8  Money as a Public Good  It is argued that, by holding money balances, an economic agent yields benefits not only to himself, but also to others in the economy.  This derives from the means of 
exchange role of money.  People will be less likely to be unable to make desired purchases, or to delay in paying bills, when they hold more money balances.  Also
will be less likely to unexpectedly issue bills for payment, or call in debts, in order to correct unexpected shortfalls in money balances when more money is held.
9  Repayment tilt  With inflation, repayments on nominal debt contracts, such as mortgages, are highest at the beginning of the loan.  This phenomenon worsens with inflation and with 
contract length.  Such repayment tilt distorts the markets in which it operates.  The most prominent example is the housing market, where the perceived cost of
increases with inflation and where inflation may also make it more difficult to qualify for a loan.  
10  Natural rate of unemployment  If inflation is associated with greater uncertainty, then it may be argued that frictional unemployment will rise as inflation increases.  This is so because uncertainty 




•  Long-Term Contracts 
•  Financial Intermediation 
•  Strike activity 
•  Wage-price spirals 
•  Interest rate risk premium 
•  Credibility effects 
•  Menu costs of changing prices 
•  Market activity effects 
•  Organisation of markets 
•  Macroeconomic stability 
There are, of course, many other costs associated with inflation.  Increased inflation uncertainty is alleged to increase the likelihood of default risk, to increase the spread 
between deposit and lending rates, and to lead to a reduction in the flow of intermediated credit.  This can have a negative effect on output and employment.  Because of 
the uncertainty surrounding the long -term price level, the willingness to enter into longer term contracts may be weakened.  This interferes with the optimum use of 
resources and, hence, lessens overall welfare.  It is sometimes argued that strike activity is higher on average when inflation is high.  The possibility of wage
and their costs in terms of volatility of output, also heightens as inflation increases.  The fact that inflation uncertainty can lead to demands by lenders for interest rate 
premiums, can lower overall investment in the economy. The central bank may also suffer from a lack of credibility in an inflationary environment, which may in turn 
lead to a loss in the efficacy with which it conducts its policies.  There are also, of course, the menu costs associated with changing list prices, catalogues, vending 
machines etc..  While such costs may be relatively unimportant in themselves, they can have wider macroeconomic implications, as argued, for example, by Mankiw 
(1985).  Laidler (1990) contends that the increased cost  of holding money can lead to a displacement of certain activities from the marketplace, where they would 
otherwise be carried out more efficiently.  Carlton (1982) argues that inflation uncertainty forces firms to rely on more liquid, less customised, markets and leads to a 
greater standardisation of products than would otherwise be the case.  Finally, Dowd (1995a) argues that the pursuit of zero inflation brings greater macroeconomic 
stability.   6
2.2  Costs of Inflation 
2.2.1  Shoe Leather Costs 
The so-called shoe leather cost, which encapsulates the general inconvenience of 
economising on money holdings due to inflation, (see row 1 of the table for a 
description) is, perhaps, the most widely discussed and measured.  In a recent paper, 
however, Fischer (1994) calculates that the welfare to be gained by reducing inflation 
from the then G-7 inflation average of 4.5% to zero would be of the order of 0.03% of 
(annual) GNP, a relatively minor amount.  Feldstein (1996) calculates that, taking only 
the costs associated with the reduction of money demand into account, reducing 
inflation from 2% to zero would involve a welfare gain of only 0.02% of GNP.  
Feldstein also finds that when the seigniorage revenue is replaced with an alternative 
distortionary tax, overall welfare is lowered by reducing inflation from 2% to zero
8.  
With the advent of financial innovation and greater competition in the financial sector, 
currency holdings have been falling in importance, and market -related interest 
payments have increasingly be en made on various components of the money stock
9.  
This cost has, accordingly, gradually declined in importance and should become even 
less significant in the future
10. 
 
2.2.2  Inflation and the Tax System 
It is commonly argued that with widespread non-indexation, inflation interacts with the 
tax system and magnifies its distortions, thereby causing large welfare losses (row 2).  
The interaction of inflation and taxation of capital is felt to be especially distortionary;  
inflation reduces the net-of-tax returns to savers and distorts capital accumulation and 
consumption decisions.  Some commentators, such as Feldstein (1996), argue that this 
is one of the most important costs associated with inflation.  Fischer (1981) calculates 
that the interaction of an inflation rate of 10% and the tax system in the US results in 
                                                 
8 Feldstein argues strongly in favour of zero inflation, however, on the basis that the interaction of 
inflation with the tax system causes large distortions.  In doing so, however, he makes the case that 
the effects of inflation on money demand cannot provide the grounds for arguing in favour of zero 
inflation.  This is discussed below.  
9 See, for example, Browne and Fell (1994) and Cronin (1994). 
10 A recent study which estimates a higher shoe leather welfare cost is Lucas (1994).  Lucas finds that 
the welfare costs of increasing inflation from a rate associated with a nominal interest rate of zero to 
one associated with an interest rate of 10% is 1.2% of GDP, taking account of fiscal considerations.  
Lucas’ study is based on a double log real money balances function which, he argues, fits the 1900 -
1985 data well for the US.   7
costs which range from 0.7% to 2% of (annual) GDP.  In a similar study, Cooley and 
Hansen (1991) estimate that such costs amount to 0.7% of GDP.  The above 
calculations do not take account of the loss of government revenue after inflation is 
reduced, however.  If, after a reduction of inflation, the government wished to keep its 
revenue constant, it would, in practice, be forced to raise taxes by some other means.  
Given that lump sum taxes are generally not feasible, raising taxes by other means 
would necessarily impose distortions, and would impact on the above welfare 
estimates.  Cooley and Hansen find that when this revenue aspect is considered, overall 
welfare is lowered by reducing inflation!    
 
More recent studies have, however, found that there are much larger costs associated 
with the interaction of inflation and the taxation system.  One of the most recent and 
rigorous studies in this area has been Feldstein (1996).  Feldstein argues that inflation 
exacerbates the capital taxation distortions that would exist even under price stability.  
He calculates that the annual dead-weight loss caused by a 2% inflation rate, after 
taking account of the above revenue effect, is a permanent ongoing cost of between 
0.63% and 1.01% of GDP
11.  The present value of such gains, using the United States 




A broader approach to this issue using Canadian data has recently been undertaken by 
Black, Macklem and Poloz (1993) who make use of a dynamic general equilibrium 
model of the Canadian economy in an attempt to analyse the (mainly tax -induced) 
effects of inflation.  This study serves to illustrate that, due to the interaction of the 
various effects of inflation, the welfare losses which result can be significant.  Using 
their model, Black et al. estimate that the welfare gains achieved by moving from a 
10% inflation rate to zero are over 10% of GDP!  When a constraint is added to the 
model, however, such that government revenue must remain constant as inflation is 
                                                 
11 Feldstein also considers a number of the other costs of inflation informally, but does not attempt to 
measure them, presumably because many such costs are not amenable to accurate measurement.  He 
does, however, argue that some of these costs could be as large as the very high cost he obtains 
through the capital taxation channel. 
12 Discounting an annual benefit  of b% of GDP at a real discount rate of r% in an economy that grows 
by y% per year yields a present value of b/(r-y).   8
reduced, these welfare gains are lower.  They nevertheless remain substantial.  
Replacing the loss of “inflation revenue” by income taxes brings the welfare gain dow n 
to 2.1%, while using consumption tax instead leaves the welfare gain at 4.9%
13.  It 
should also be noted that when growth is endogenised in the model, the lowering of 
inflation leads to an increase in this growth rate, and the welfare gains are magnified 
once more to levels greater than the original 10% figure
14. 
 
2.2.3  Unit of Account and Uncertainty Effects 
Several observers, such as Konieczny (1993), Howitt (1993), Freedman (1991) and 
Summers (1991) have argued that the main costs of inflation are assoc iated with 
money’s role as a unit of account, i.e. the way in which goods and services are priced 
in terms of money (row 3)
15.  Because prices play crucially important allocational and 
informational roles in the marketplace, anything which interferes with such signals 
“strikes at the heart of the economy” in the words of Ball and Romer (1993).  Most 
studies suggest that relative and aggregate price uncertainty increases with inflation
16, 
thus providing a powerful argument in favour of price stability.    
 
Such uncertainty may be important even when there are low prevailing rates of 
inflation.  Koneiczny (1993) makes the telling comparison of money’s role as a unit of 
account in an inflationary environment and the way in which other units of account (for 
instance of distance or weight) would cause confusion if they were systematically 
altered in a similar manner.  Imagine, for example, the puzzlement which would be 
caused if a unit of measurement, such as a mile, was adjusted by a steady 3 per cent. 
per annum
17.  This would be accentuated if the rate of increase remained modest but 
varied from year to year.  This form of uncertainty would be likely to carry over to the 
                                                 
13 If the revenue loss arising from the reduction of inflation is replaced by raising corporate taxation it 
is found that welfare is reduced slightly as inflation is lowered.  
14 The authors admit to the fact that they do not attempt to model the adverse impact which inflation 
has on the signalling role of prices which would “probably constitute the most important component 
of the total costs of inflation” (p.478).  These are discussed in Section 2.2.3.  
15 Indeed, Konieczny (1993) goes so far as to argue that this is the only cost which can provide strong 
arguments in favour of price stability.  
16 See Briault (1995) for several references to relevant studies, together with the need for caution in 
interpreting such results. 
17 After ten years of increases of 3 per cent. the length of a mile would have increased by over a third!  
Similarly the value of a pound would be devalued by a similar amount ove r the same time period at an 
inflation rate of 3% per annum.   9
general price level, even with moderate rates of inflation.  Furthermore, there is even 
greater uncertainty caused, when in response to menu costs associated with changing 
prices and fixed-term nominal contracts, different sectors adjust their prices at different 
points in time.  Given the central role of prices in the market economy, it is easy to 
envisage such confusion causing widespread damage.  It is very difficult to quantify 
such effects, however, and as a result few attempts have been made to measure the 
welfare effects arising from the unit of account role of money in the face of a moderate 
inflation. 
 
One such recent attempt to do this is Ball and Romer (1993).  In their model, they 
assume that the aggregate price level rises steadily and that there is no confusion 
concerning the general level of prices.  Instead, their focus is on relative pr ice 
variability and the uncertainty which ensues when firms change their prices in a 
sluggish and uncoordinated manner.  They find that, in a two period model with 
plausible parameters imposed, where customers and firms form long -term 
relationships, the welfare costs arising from the price confusion caused by inflation of 
10% per annum amount to 0.25% of GNP.  In addition, such confusion gives rise to a 
lower price elasticity of demand for most goods.  This results in higher price mark -ups 
on costs and, hence, lowers overall consumer welfare by an even greater amount than 
the first effect.  It can be seen that they remain non-trivial even at low inflation rates.  
It is important to note that Ball and Romer’s model is highly stylised and concentrates 
on the reduction in welfare arising from the microeconomic uncertainty caused by a 
steady inflation rate.  This study does not consider the possibility that variability in 
inflation creates confusion between nominal and relative prices, as per Lucas (1973), 
on the grounds that such uncertainty may only be relevant to high -inflation countries.  
Although the Ball and Romer approach is a very useful way of analysing the costs 
arising from relative price uncertainty, further modelling of the costs arising from this 
form of confusion would be very beneficial.  Such new approaches may yield welfare 
losses which are far larger than those tentatively estimated by Ball and Romer.    10
2.2.4  Inflation and Economic Growth 
As Feldstein (1996) argues, higher inflation may not reduc e the economic growth rate 
and still have significant welfare effects if it reduces the  level of income each year.  
Nevertheless, the welfare effects will be greatly amplified if economic growth is 
affected by inflation.  Given the alleged drawbacks associated with inflation, some 
observers argue that inflation does indeed interfere with the economic growth 
prospects of an economy (row 4).  Although there is plenty of evidence suggesting that 
high rates of inflation are unambiguously bad for growth, the eff ects of low and 
moderate inflation on an economy’s growth prospects are not so clear (see, for 
example, the many recent empirical results discussed by Fischer, 1996).  Nevertheless, 
as Black, Macklem and Poloz (1993) argue, it does not take a very large reduction in 
economic growth prospects to have large welfare effects.  Such growth effects may be 
too small to detect in the data.  In addition, they argue that, as there have not been 
many changes in inflation regimes over the past 30 years or so, it may be  asking too 
much of the data to uncover an unambiguous link between inflation and growth
18. 
 
More recently Dotsey and Ireland (1996) uncovered very large general equilibrium 
welfare effects associated with inflation of 4% (running to over 1% of GDP per annum 
using M1 as the measure of money).  The bulk of these costs were associated with the 
adverse effects of inflation on economic growth even though the impact on growth 
itself is very small, being of the order of 0.06% per annum.  This reinforces the point 
made above by Black et al. and the argument of Lucas (1987) that policies which have 
even small growth effects can involve large welfare consequences.  
                                                 
18 Macklem and Poloz (1993) also provide other reasons why such a relationship may not be clear at 
low inflation rates.  One reason may be that many of activities engaged in to avoid the effects of 
inflation themselves increase measured GDP.  To this extent, such output figures may provide an 
overstatement of welfare in an inflationary environment.  They also argue that there is a tendency for 
governments to set up programmes as the economy grows;  thus there will be a tendency for 
governments to raise distortionary taxes as inflation falls and vice versa.    11
2.2.5  Redistribution Costs 
Unexpected inflation also imposes arbitrary and iniquitous redistribution costs, both in 
income and, more strikingly, in wealth (see row 5)
19.  Fischer and Modigliani (1978), 
by calculating the volume of non -indexed linked assets in the U.S. economy, estimate 
that an unanticipated rise of just 1% in the price level would produce a  wealth transfer 
equivalent to approximately 1% of GNP.  Although for every loser there is a gainer in 
such a scenario, there are, nevertheless, welfare losses associated with such an 
arbitrary distribution of wealth.  Such welfare losses cannot be estimated accurately, 
however, as it would involve a complex welfare function that appropriately weights the 
welfare of every individual.  They are, nevertheless, likely to be substantial.  Those, 
such as pensioners dependant on fixed, or less than fully indexed n ominal incomes, are 
also badly affected by inflation
20. 
 
2.2.6  Resources Devoted to Financial Sector 
Another cost involves devotion of scarce resources - which may have been put to more 
productive purposes - to finding ways to deal with inflation (row 6).  Leijonhufvud 
(1981) makes this point quite forcefully.  He argues that in an inflationary environment 
“being efficient and competitive at the production and distribution of ‘real’ goods and 
services becomes less important to the real outcome of socio-economic activity.  
Forecasting inflation and coping with its consequences become more important.  
People will reallocate their effort and ingenuity accordingly” (p. 247)
21.  More 
generally, Leijonhufvud argues that, given the increased unpredictability associated 
with inflation, people will tend to substitute political lobbying for private contracts in 
an attempt to ensure a predictable real income for themselves.  Dotsey and Ireland 
(1996), using a general equilibrium model, estimate that the welfare effects o f the 
                                                 
19 See Laidler and Parkin (1975) for an earlier account of the redistribution consequences of 
unanticipated inflation.  Bulir and Gulde (1995) provide recent evidence that higher inflation is 
associated with greater income inequality.  
20 Bulow (1982) provides a thorough account of the effects of inflation on pensions. 
21 This argument is also made by Howitt (1990a), who contends that such misdirection  of resources, 
together with its adverse effects on productivity, may be one of the most important costs of inflation.  
Dowd (1995b) and English (1996) also stress the importance of this cost.   12
diversion of labour to the financial sector can be as high as 0.21% of GDP at a  steady 
inflation rate of 4%
22. 
 
2.2.7  Asset Price Bubbles/Overinvestment in Inflation Hedges 
Freedman (1991) argues that one of the more adverse effects of inflation in practice is 
“the tendency for inflationary economies to develop expectational bubbles that result in 
overshoots in expected prices of tangible assets and raw materials” (p. 614).  This 
leads to overinvestment in certain types of activity, such as speculativ e building, and 
can end up having very detrimental effects (row 7).  This is seen most vividly in the 
property price bubble which evolved in the late 1980s in the United Kingdom which, 
when it imploded, had widespread and damaging effects on the economy.  
 
2.2.8  Money as a Public Good 
Laidler (1990) makes a convincing argument that, given its means of exchange role, 
money should be seen as a public good (see row 8).  This is because adequate real 
balance holdings minimise rent -seeking behaviour in the form of accelerating requests 
for payment and delaying the payment of bills.  Accordingly, by reducing real money 
holdings, inflation may lead to an increase in such damaging behaviour
23.  Laidler 
argues that such costs are usually ignored when discussing the costs of inflation and 
that more attention should be paid to this aspect of the means of exchange function of 
money. 
 
2.2.9  Repayment Tilt 
Inflation makes it more costly to service payments at the beginning of a loan, given that 
repayments are usually denoted in nominal terms.  Accordingly, the real value of loan 
repayments falls over time in a process which is labelled “repayment tilt”
24.  This effect 
is especially prevalent in longer term loans, such as housing mortgages, which leads to 
distortions in such markets (row 9).  Konieczny (1993) uses a measure of tilt which 
comprises the ratio of the real value of the last to the first payment on a 25 year 
                                                 
22 One could envisage even greater welfare effects if the responses to variable inflation were 
incorporated into the model. 
23 See also Summers (1991), who surmises that such inflation -induced rent-seeking behaviour could 
be important. 
24 See Howitt (1990a) for a description of this effect.   13
mortgage.  He calculates that this ratio is 0.61 at an inflation rate of 2% and 0.38 at an 
inflation rate of 4%. 
 
2.2.10  Natural Rate of Unemployment 
Friedman (1977) contends that the natural rate of unemployment may increase with 
inflation as relative price uncertainty is increased and the signalling power of prices is 
impaired.  For instance, workers and firms may find it more difficult to match offers in 
an inflationary environment, thus leading to an increase in frictional unemployment.  
He concedes, however, that eventually institutions will emerge to deal with this 
uncertainty, thereby leaving the long-run natural rate unaffected
25.  This latter 
concession is disputed by Ragan (1993), who suggests that the fixed costs of setting up 
such institutions could leave Friedman’s initial hypothesis remaining valid, even in the 
longer term. 
 
2.2.11  Other Costs of Inflation 
There are, of course, many other costs associated with inflation and some of these are 
outlined in row 11 of the Table.  Inflation may lead to a decrease in the willingness of 
people to enter into long-term contracts.  The welfare effects of such a decline in the 
availability of nominal contracting have not been analysed rigorously and are, 
therefore, disputed.  Dowd (1995b), on the one hand, argues that the effects could be 
quite important, whereas Fischer (1993) contends that the absence of such long -term 
nominal contracts probably does not have much of an impact on the economy.  Ragan 
(1993) argues that inflation uncertainty leads to a reduction in the amount of 
intermediated credit by increasing the likelihood of loan default.  He subsequently 
makes use of regression analysis based on Canadian data to support his claim.  To the 
extent that certain classes of borrowers are dependant on bank credit this can lead to a 
decline in output and employment
26. 
 
                                                 
25 Although Friedman argues that the natural rate of unemployment should remain invariant to the 
rate of inflation in the very long run (which, he argues, may last for decades), he does contend, 
nevertheless, that the overall productivity of the economy will remain adversely affected.  
26 See, for example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1994) who stress the 
importance of the credit channel and its effects on output.   14
Both Leijonhufvud (1981) and Selody (1990) argue that strike activity increases with 
inflation.  It is argued that inflation creates uncertainty with respect to wage and salary 
negotiations.  Such uncertainty means that negotiations are undertaken more often, 
providing ground for disagreement and strike activity.  Selody provides some 
suggestive supporting data and cites the studies covered in Lacroix and Dussault 
(1979) as supporting this hypothesis.  Also connected with the above cost is the 
increased likelihood of wage-price spirals in an inflationary environment, together with 
the damaging recessions which usually follow, as argued by Bonin (1993).  Britain’s 
boom-bust cycles since the 1970s are a classic example of the adverse effects of wage -
price spirals. 
 
Another cost is the risk premium on interest rates demanded by lenders to compensate 
them for the possibility of unanticipated inflation
27.  Furthermore, in an inflationary 
environment, the central bank may suffer from a lack of credibility which lessens the 
efficacy with which it can carry out its policies.  Some authors, such as Konieczny 
(1993) argue that a zero inflation objective is the most credible, on the basis that it 
provides stability to money’s central role as a unit of account.  Selody (1990) also 
argues that price stability is likely  to be the most credible on the basis that it is the only 
goal which fulfils the basic mandate of central banks.  Crow (1988) also supports such 
a viewpoint by stating that “if the authorities were unwilling to act to get the rate of 
inflation down from, for example, 4 per cent, why should anyone believe that they 
would be any more willing to get it back to 4 per cent if, for one reason or another, 
upward pressures on prices led the inflation rate to rise to 5 per cent?”.  Feldstein 
(1996) also makes the argument that a history of price stability may bring a credibility 
bonus which helps in dealing with inflation shocks.  
 
On the other hand, however, Summers (1991) argues that it is very difficult to 
persuade people that the rate of inflation will remain at zero if the costs of inflation 
around zero are perceived as small, while the benefit of some small inflation is seen as 
positive.  Fischer (1993) also contends that monetary authorities which have succeeded 
                                                 
27 A concrete example of such an effect is the risk premium demanded by purchasers of Irish 
government and corporate bonds, which is due at least in part to the risk of inflation.  Such a risk 
premium can lead to an overall lowering of investment in the economy.    15
in keeping inflation at low but, nevertheless, posi tive levels have reaped rewards in 
terms of credibility gains.  He does, however, concede that there is a possibility that a 
central bank with a record of zero inflation over long periods could be far more 
credible than any existing central bank.    
 
Finally, there are the menu costs associated with changing prices which may have 
wider macroeconomic implications, the displacement of certain activities from the 




2.3  Overall Assessment 
A number of points emerge from the above discussion.  The wide variety of costs 
associated with inflation and the subtlety of their effects is noteworthy.  This is hardly 
surprising, given the varied and incredibly complex informational and allocational roles 
which prices perform in a market economy.  Given such subtlety, it is quite possible 
that the above table merely represents the “tip of the iceberg” insofar as the costs of 
inflation are concerned.  Keynes’ citation, presented at the b eginning of the paper, 
wherein he argues that the debauching of the currency (i.e. inflation) wreaks 
destruction “in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose” is of 
relevance in this regard.  Given the subtle nature of many of the effects of inflation 
listed in Table 1 above, it is also not surprising that their welfare costs remain largely 
unmeasured (or perhaps even unmeasurable).  Howitt (1990b), for example, argues 
that welfare analysis of inflation is very difficult because “the inst itution of money is so 
deeply embedded in our economy that inflation has a systematic effect not restricted to 
any particular market.  Conventional cost-benefit analysis is ill -suited for analysing 
effects that are not isolated to a few markets.  This difficulty is compounded by the 
inability of conventional economic theory to make much sense at all of the institution 
of money” (p. 108)
29. 
                                                 
28 See Mankiw (1985), Laidler (1990) and Carlton (1982) for discussions of these three effects.  
29 Leijonhufvud (1981) argues even more strongly against the various attempts to quantify the welfare 
costs and benefits of inflation by means of the use of social welfare functions:  “Is a choice -theoretical 
formulation always the sine qua non for ‘rational’ conduct of policy?  ...  Squeezed into the apples and 
oranges frame, the world is portrayed ‘as if’ understood  ...  When the ‘as if’ clause hides  more in the 
way of unrecognised distortion than of probabilistic approximation of the situation, the ‘constructivist 
error’ is afoot.  And that way lies the ‘Collectivisation of Hubris’ ” (p. 289).  The above arguments are   16
 
Of the various costs which have been quantified, it seems clear that the shoe leather 
costs are relatively unimportant at moderate inflation rates and set to decline further 
over time.  Furthermore, it remains the case that a clear link between economic growth 
at such rates has not yet been satisfactorily established.  As discussed earlier, however, 
higher inflation may not reduce economic  growth rates and still have significant welfare 
effects if it reduces the level of income each year. 
 
Certain channels have, however, been identified through which inflation may impose 
large costs even at low inflation rates.  For example, the way in which inflation 
interferes with money’s role as a unit of account represents a potentially large cost of 
even low inflation.  Such a possibility has been stressed by many observers, and is 
given some empirical backing by Ball and Romer (1993), as discussed earlier.  The 
welfare effects of the interaction of inflation with imperfectly indexed taxation systems 
have also been much discussed and measured.  As noted earlier, Feldstein (1996) and 
Black, Macklem and Poloz (1993) both illustrate that, due to the interaction of 
inflation and partially indexed taxation systems, the welfare costs of low inflations can 
be highly significant.  
 
Furthermore, it is likely that the welfare costs of inflation are understated using the 
usual partial equilibrium style of analysis.  This point emerges quite clearly from two 
recent general equilibrium studies of the costs of inflation  - Black, Macklem and Poloz 
(1993), which was discussed above, and which uncovered large welfare effects of 
inflation, and Dotsey and Ireland (1996).  The latter paper, using a general equilibrium 
monetary model in which inflation distorts a variety of marginal decisions, uncovered 
welfare effects as high as 1% of GDP per annum associated with a steady inflation rate 
of 4%.  The authors find that, despite the fact that none of the distortions are 
individually very large, their combined influence involves substantial welfare effects.  
 
Overall, it has been demonstrated that inflation can have pervasive and damaging 
effects on an economy, even at low rates.  Taking the unmeasured costs into account 
                                                                                                                                           
not meant to suggest a full retreat from the attempt to quantify the various costs of inflation.  Their   17
this conclusion would perhaps be strengthened considerably.  As a result, the 
desirability of aiming for a zero rate of inflation must be seriously entertained.  Before 
doing so, however, we first turn our attention to the possible costs associated with 
attempting to achieve a zero inflation goal. 
 
3. Price Stability - Transitional Costs 
3.1  Introduction 
The widespread and pervasive costs associated with inflation do not in themselves 
provide sufficient reason for moving to price stability.  This is because there can be 
substantial welfare losses associated with disinflation;  accordingly, the possibility that 
such transitional costs may outweigh the benefits of price stability must be considered.  
Certain authors, such as Feldstein (1996), argue that, because the welfare gains 
associated with price stability are permanent, while the losses associated with moving 
towards this state are temporary, only small gains are necessary to substantially 
outweigh the transitional costs involved.  There exists, however, a further strand of 
opinion which holds that there may in fact be  permanent welfare reductions associated 
with price stability.  This section analyses the transitional costs of moving to price 
stability.  Subsequently, Section 4 concentrates on the possibility of there being 
permanent costs associated with price stability and then briefly examines whether 
implementing strategies to “live with” moderate rates of inflation are feasible.  
                                                                                                                                           
purpose is, instead, intended to illustrate some of the difficulties involved in attempting to do so.    18
3.2  Transitional Costs of Moving to Price Stability 
It is widely agreed among the economics profession that there are output costs 
associated with disinflation, at least in the short run
30. Gordon (1982), for example, 
documents the costly nature of various disinflations over a variety of countries in the 
past.  The ratio of the temporary reduction in real GDP to the fall in inflation is 
referred to as the sacrifice ratio.  It is affected by many factors, including the degree of 
inflation inertia, the credibility of disin flationary policies, the speed of the disinflation, 
the level of inflation from which the disinflation is being effected, and the extent of 
nominal wage and price rigidity.  As such, the sacrifice ratio for a particular economy 
should not be taken as given and should instead be viewed as being capable of 
influence, to a certain extent at least. 
 
First, the sacrifice ratio may be dependant upon the credibility of the central bank.  If 
the public do not believe the central bank’s commitment to price stability , then the 
sacrifice ratio will be large.  Conversely, however, if policy announcements concerning 
a move towards price stability are believed by the public, then the transitional costs 
may well be close to zero.  Taylor (1980, 1983) demonstrates theoretically that if an 
announced disinflation policy is credible, then inflation can be lowered without any 
cost in terms of lost output, even in the presence of staggered wage contracts.  
Furthermore, Sargent (1982) has demonstrated the plausibility of costless disinflations, 
using evidence from previous recoveries from hyperinflations.  Buiter and Miller 
(1985) and Aiyagari (1990) argue, however, that fiscal policy must ultimately be 
supportive of monetary policy if the latter is to be credible.  On a closely related front, 
it has also been argued that policies which make the central bank more independent 
may also improve the nature of the sacrifice ratio.  Recent empirical studies surveyed 
by Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) suggest the opposite relationship appear s to hold 
empirically, however.  Such results are, in our view, highly counterintuitive, however, 
and would certainly warrant further research before any firm conclusions could be 
reached. 
 
                                                 
30 Howitt (1990a) argues that there will, in addition, be redistribution costs associated with 
disinflation, with debtors, for example, suffering and creditors gaining.    19
The speed with which inflations are carried out is also important.  Both Ball (1994) 
and Yates and Chapple (1996) have found evidence supporting the view that the 
sacrifice ratio is smaller if a disinflation is carried out quickly.  On the other hand, King 
(1996) argues that the optimal speed of disinflation from a moder ate initial position 
involves a gradual approach and that there should also be some accommodation of 
temporary shocks. 
 
Briault (1995) and Edey, Funke, Kennedy and Palerm (1995) argue that the trade-off 
between inflation and output may become worse at low inflation rates.  Any such 
worsening of the trade-off may arise, for example, if wage and price adjustments 
become less frequent when inflation is low.  If this was the case the economy would 
have to suffer more extensive output losses as an inflation rate of zero was being 
approached.  The latest empirical results provide a mixed picture on the above view.  
Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) and Yates and Chapple (1996) find that the trade -off 
is indeed worse as inflation is lowered.  Edey (1994) argues, however, that the 
empirical findings in this area are not conclusive.  Furthermore, Edey et al. (1995) 
contend that contrasting the sacrifice ratios of the low inflation 1950s/1960s with those 
of the post-1973 period for the US, Japan and Germany do not provide much support 
for such a proposition. 
 
Where markets are more flexible the scope for disinflating without large output losses 
is greatly improved.  Estimates suggest that the costs of disinflation are lower, for 
instance, in economies with more flexible labour markets.  See, for example, OECD 
(1989).  Furthermore, Ball (1994) confirms that the sacrifice ratio increases with 
nominal wage rigidity, while Ball (1996) argues that the duration of welfare benefit 
payments is also an important factor in this regard .  Finally, while Romer (1993) argues 
that the sacrifice ratio becomes lower as an economy becomes increasingly open, Ball 
(1994) does not find any evidence to support this. 
 
Ball (1994) estimates that the sacrifice ratio varies considerably among countries, with 
some sacrifice ratios being close to zero and others approaching 3.  He estimates an 
average sacrifice ratio of 0.72 for Ireland.  Using such a ratio, together with a real 
discount rate of 5% it would merely take a permanent gain of 0.014% of GNP to be   20
associated with the movement from 2% inflation to price stability to offset the 
transitional costs of getting there.  It can be seen from this calculation that even if a 
very large sacrifice ratio held in Ireland, only very modest annual gains associated with 
price stability would be required to offset this. 
 
4. Price Stability - Permanent Costs 
4.1  Labour Market Hysteresis 
If moving to a regime of price stability from a regime of low inflation brought with it 
only temporary costs, as is assumed in most of the sacrifice ratio literature, the case for 
price stability would remain very strong.  There is, nevertheless, an emerging body of 
opinion which holds that the costs of moving to price stability may be permanent.  It is 
argued, for example, that policies designed to lower inflation can result in increases in 
unemployment which become permanent
31.  This may arise, for example, where the 
unemployed gradually lose their skills and find it impossible to reintegrate into the 
labour market after the disinflation has ended.  In a paper which supports this 
hysteresis view, Ball (1996) contends that the main cause of the rising non -
accelerating-inflation rates of unemployment (NAIRU’s) in the OECD in the 1980s 
was the tight monetary policies countries pursued to reduce inflation.  He argues, 
moreover, that this result is crucially dependant on the unemployment benefit system:  
those countries which disinflated most and who made unemployment benefits payable 
for long periods, suffered the worst rises in unemployment.  In fact, contrasting the 
unemployment experienced of Ireland and Italy throughout this period, Ball argues that 
the main reason for the varying unemployment performance of both countries was the 
unemployment benefit system:  benefits last indefinitely in Ireland but only for six 
months in Italy.  Ball’s conclusions are highly controversial, however, and should be 
regarded as tentative.  The idea that disinflations from the high rates seen in the late 
1970s and early 1980s cause permanent increases in unemployment does not command 
widespread acceptability
32. The fact that this may be the case for very low inflation 
                                                 
31 When a negative shock leads to a permanent increase in the natural rate of unemployment, this is 
referred to as full labour market hysteresis.  Although it is commonly believed that the unemployment 
rate in most OECD countries is highly persistent, there is little support for t he possibility of there 
being full hysteresis.  See Elmeskov (1993) for a review of topic of unemployment persistence. 
32 Many other factors, such as union power, labour market legislation, minimum wages and tax 
wedges have been suggested by various authors as the underlying causes of the increase in 
unemployment which occurred in the 1980s.  (See, for example, Browne and McGettigan, 1993 for   21
rates has been gaining ground in the recent past, however, and it is this possibility 
which we now consider. 
 
4.2  Downwardly Rigid Nominal Wages 
Although the possibility that very low inflation rates might be costly in terms of lost 
output and employment was entertained by earlier observers such as Tobin (1972), the 
publication of a recent article by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) has led t o a 
renewed interest in this topic.  In essence, Akerlof et al. argue that inflation greases the 
wheels of the labour market by allowing real wages to fall even when nominal wages 
are downwardly rigid.  Hence, although firms can engineer needed real wage cuts in 
times of difficulty in a positive inflation era, this may not be possible when the price 
level is stable.  Accordingly, the reluctance of workers to countenance nominal wage 
cuts interferes with the ability of firms to deal with economic shocks and  can, 
therefore, lead to closures and cutbacks.  When the rate of inflation approaches zero 
the number of firms so constrained increases and this leads to greater output and 
employment losses.  According to the authors these permanent costs swamp the 
permanent benefits of price stability.  
 
Many arguments can, however, be levelled at the above conclusions.  For instance, 
Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996) contend that, if a policy of price stability is 
pursued, nominal wage reductions should no longer be seen as unusual and the 
widespread reluctance to countenance nominal wage cuts may disappear.  Gordon also 
draws lessons from the 1890s and the 1920s in the United States.  Although both 
periods were characterised by price stability, unemployment did not behave as 
predicted by the authors.  Mankiw (1996) also makes the point that, although nominal 
wage rigidity may cause real wages to be too high in certain periods, many firms and 
workers are engaged in long-run relationships, and the effects of such real wage 
overruns may not, therefore, be as severe as suggested by the authors.  Overall, he 
contends that the “idea that inflation greases the wheels of the labour market is still 
more an intriguing conjecture than a well -confirmed theory”.  Mullins Jr. (1996) argues 
                                                                                                                                           
such explanations of the rise in Irish unemployment during this period.)  Ball acknowledges this and 
tests for the inclusion of a variety of such variables in his regressions but none emerges as statistically 
significant.    22
that the sole focus on downwardly rigid nominal wages is misplaced.  He contends that 
employers are left with “two degrees of freedom”, i.e. the possibility of adjusting non -
wage benefits and hours of work which “should provide ample grease for the wheels  of 
the labour market” (p. 206).  Finally, as admitted by Akerlof et al. themselves, their 
arguments really only gather force when average productivity growth rates are quite 
low, as in the United States
33.  In an economy such as Ireland, where productivity 




4.3  Monetary Policy Under Price Stability 
The argument that monetary policy might be less effective under a regime of stable 
prices has also been put forward.  Such a possibility has been labelled the  Summers 
effect.  In essence, Summers (1991) argues that at certain times it may be necessary for 
an economy to have negative real (i.e. inflation -adjusted) interest rates.  For instance, 
in the midst of a deep recession, negative real interest rates may be a necessary tool for 
policymakers.  As the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, given that people 
would move into cash if such rates were imposed, the economy foregoes this 
possibility when there is pric e stability
35.  Thus, price stability may lead to more 
persistent recessions and to distortions in the capital market when there are warranted 
negative real interest rates
36. 
 
Whether or not there are ever warranted negative real interest rates is, of course, open 
to debate.  Freedman (1996) stresses that the achievement of price stability would lead 
to a dampening of business cycle fluctuations, given that post -war periods of deep 
recession have typically been preceded by periods of high inflation.  If this  was the 
                                                 
33 Greenspan (1996) contends that if “we are getting rising productivity as the inflation rate falls, the 
nominal distribution of earnings will move to the right and, hence, even the issue of negative nominal 
changes in wages becomes less significant” (p. 48).  
34 It may not, however, be wise to expect the exceptionally high productivity growth rates of recent 
years to continue ad infinitum. 
35 There is, however, the possibility that small negative interest rates could be offered on deposits 
given that there might be some reluctance to convert fully to cash, given security and convenience 
considerations (see, for example, Bootle, 1996).  Bootle dismisses, on the grounds of impracticality, 
suggestions that it may be possible to offer negative interest rates on cash by, for example, issuing 
dated notes that depreciate in value over time, or alternatively taxing note issues.  It is also easy to 
envisage such schemes causing large welfare-reducing distortions by interfering with money’s role as 
a unit of account.   23
case, the need for negative real interest rates would be reduced.  McPhail (1993) 
suggests that observed negative real interest rates in the past were probably due more 
to errors in anticipating inflation than to any economic need for such negative real 
rates.  Furthermore, Edey et al. (1995) and Edey (1994) argue that, on the basis of 
historical experience, negative real interest rates occurred in periods where they were 
not necessary, and indeed quite damaging, as in the 1970s.  Freedman (1996) co ntends 
that, even though nominal rates may be constrained at zero, this may in turn imply real 
interest rates significantly below their equilibrium value
37.  It also seems to be the case 
that financial markets are increasingly reacting to higher expected inflation by selling 
bonds and causing the nominal interest rate to rise.  Accordingly, the feasibility of 
engineering negative real interest rates, even if this were thought to be desirable, may 
be questionable in today’s financial environment.  In addition , engineering negative real 
interest rates is not the only demand management tool available to policymakers  - 
exchange rate changes or fiscal policy measures can, for example, also be used.  
 
Finally, it was pointed out by various participants at the recent Jackson Hole 
Symposium on “Achieving Price Stability” that monetary policy does not become 
powerless when it is not in a position to engineer negative real interest rates.  For 
instance, it is widely argued that there are many  direct links between money and/or 
credit and spending
38, and that many other asset prices other than short-term interbank 
rates are important in the monetary transmission mechanism
39. 
 
4.4  Policies Designed to Live With Inflation 
Although no consensus exists on the optimal inflation rate, it is widely agreed that 
there are costs associated with even the low inflation rate which currently prevails.  An 
option that is sometimes put forward as an alternative to aiming for price stability is the 
                                                                                                                                           
36 See also Konieczny (1993) for a thorough discussion of the Summers effect. 
37 This begs the question of whether equilibrium real interest rates have been increasing over time.  
Freedman (1996) argues that financial market liberalisation may have led to an increase in the 
equilibrium real interest rate, while Summers (1996b) contends that if widespread fiscal consolidation 
occurs, this will lead to a reduction in such real rates.  For accounts of the many factors determining 
equilibrium real interest rates, see, for example, Blanchard and Summers (1984) and Barro and Sala -
i-Martin (1990). 
38 The direct link between money and spending is associated with the well -known real balance effect 
(see, for example, Patinkin, 1987), while the direct credit effect is well summarised by Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1994).    24
possibility of indexing to overcome some of  the problems caused by inflation. Friedman 
(1974), Fischer (1993) and Aiyagari (1990) argue that the tax system should be fully 
indexed to deal with its interaction with inflation.  Feldstein (1996) counters such 
suggestions by arguing that although there is a long history of proposals to index the 
tax system, most taxation systems remain unindexed.  He suggests that this is due to 
various legal and administrative difficulties involved in indexing.  He also makes the 
point that if indexing leads to less pub lic support for anti-inflationary policies, this may 
result in a higher inflation outcome and a lower level of overall welfare
40.  Friedman 
(1974) and Fischer (1993) also argue that the issuance of inflation -indexed government 
bonds would bring welfare gains.  This seems likely to be true given that such 
indexation increases the range of investment instruments which are available, in 
addition to reducing the attractiveness of inflationary policies to governments.  As long 
as the majority of bonds remained un indexed this should not serve to remove the 
counterinflationary influence of the bond market.  The indexation of wages can, 
however, lead to problems of inflexibility and to a toleration of inflation, as was 
tellingly demonstrated by the adverse impact of the scala mobile in Italy
41 until its 
recent abandonment.  Finally, the indexation of general private contracts and 
accounting techniques, although perhaps desirable, is very difficult to envisage being 
introduced on a wide scale in practice. 
 
Overall, the incentives for the introduction of widespread indexation were far greater in 
the inflationary environment of the 1970s.  Given the lack of action on indexation in 
such circumstances, it seems unlikely that any moves on this front will be forthcoming 
in the current low inflation environment.  
 
In summary, the desirability of indexing in order to deal with ongoing inflation is a very 
contentious issue.  Although it may bring benefits in certain areas, it has also been 
challenged on the basis that it is impract ical, unlikely to be enacted, and could lead to 
public attitudes that are more benign towards inflation, thus perhaps having adverse 
effects on welfare.  One thing is clear, however:  If the costs of inflation outweigh the 
                                                                                                                                           
39 See, for example, Mishkin (1995) and Brunner and Meltzer (1993).  
40 See, for example, Fischer and Summers (1989), for a model which generates such an outcome.  
41 The scala mobile automatically indexed wage payments in Italy.    25
putative benefits, then the first best solution is to eliminate inflation and not to deal, in 
a second-best manner, with an unwarranted inflation through indexation.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Since the 1970s, inflation rates in most industrialised countries have fallen dramatically.  
As a result a new debate has emerged among economists and policymakers alike:  
Should monetary authorities be content to let inflation settle at its current low levels, 
or, alternatively, should they attempt to move towards a position of price stability?  
This paper devotes its attention to this important topic. 
 
Those who argue in favour of price stability base their recommendations on the many 
costs which are associated with inflation (see Table 1).  Although some of these costs 
decline to negligible levels  at the low inflation rates currently being observed, some 
studies, such as Feldstein (1996), Black, Macklem and Poloz (1993), Ball and Romer 
(1993) and Dotsey and Ireland (1996) find evidence in support of significant adverse 
welfare costs at low inflation rates.  Interestingly, the two main general equilibrium 
approaches used thus far in analysing the costs of inflation (i.e. Black, Macklem and 
Poloz, 1993, and Dotsey and Ireland, 1996) uncover very large adverse welfare effects 
associated with even moderate inflation rates.  This suggests that the partial 
equilibrium approach usually employed may understate the true costs of inflation.   
 
The significant costs associated with the low inflation rates currently prevailing do not 
necessarily provide one with a convincing argument in favour of price stability, 
however.  The reason is that there are costs associated with moving to a situation of 
stable prices.  It was, however, tellingly demonstrated in the paper, that even if there 
were very large (but, nevertheless, temporary) costs associated with disinflation (which 
does not appear to be the case based on the available empirical evidence), these should 
be swamped by the welfare gains associated with price stability, because such gains are 
permanent.  Unless the sacrifice ratio explodes as we move towards zero inflation, this 
argument should continue to hold. 
 
There have, however, been a variety of arguments put forward recently, that there may 
in fact be permanent costs associated with a policy devoted to price stability and that   26
these may outweigh the putative benefits of such a policy.  Such a charge, if warranted, 
would represent a much more serious challenge to the desirability of price stability than 
the conventional transitional costs argument.  These arguments take three forms. 
 
First, there is the argument that not only may there be temporary costs associated with 
transition to price stability, as the conventional sacrifice ratio literature argues, but that 
costs of a permanent nature may arise.  Ball (1996) argues that the various disinflations 
of the 1980s were largely responsible for the recorded increase in the NAIRUs in 
OECD countries.  It is fair to say, however, that this view is highly controversial, and 
that a wide variety of other factors have been put forward by various authors for the 
observed increases in the natural unemployment rates.   
 
Second, there is Tobin’s (1972) argument, recently elaborated in Akerlof, Dickens and 
Perry (1996) that price stability will lead to an increase in the natur al rate of 
unemployment, given that inflation allegedly greases the wheels of the labour market 
by allowing real wages to fall, even when nominal wages are downwardly rigid.  Many 
counterarguments have been levelled against this proposition, and these were outlined 
in the previous section.  Perhaps the most damning argument which can be made 
against this proposition, however, is the fact that it relies upon continued money 
illusion and involves deliberately distorting the unit of account upwards in order to  
engineer lower sustainable unemployment rates.  As Fischer (1996) argues, “money 
illusion is after all an illusion, one that is likely to yield eventually to the weight of 
facts” (p. 11). 
 
The final main argument against price stability is predicated upon the so -called 
Summers effect.  This centres on the possibility that monetary policy may not be as 
effective under a regime of price stability, as it is impossible to generate negative real 
interest rates in such an environment.  It has been argued, however, that negative real 
interest rates may not be needed in practice, and that occurrences of such rates in the 
past have sometimes been problematic rather than helpful (the negative real rates of the 
1970s being a case in point).  Others have argued that monetary policy can retain its 
effectiveness even when negative real rates cannot be engineered given the many direct 
links between money and demand and, in addition, monetary policy’s effects through a   27
wide variety of asset prices.  Finally, exchange rate a nd fiscal policy could also be used 
as substitutes if the need arose. 
 
Overall, it can be seen that although there appears, on the basis of the literature 
reviewed, to be a good case for moving towards price stability, this remains a highly 
controversial area of debate.  Perhaps it would be better to allow the debate to move 
on further before committing to a policy of price stability which may not be optimal.  
We are, accordingly, forced to conclude our paper in the same manner as a number of 
other commentators in this area, viz. it is simply not possible, given the stage at which 
the current debate is at, to arrive at a definite value for the optimal rate of inflation.  
The debate thus far appears to lean towards the desirability of a price stability 
objective.  However, in Scottish legal parlance, it is fair to say that the case remains 
not proven.   28
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